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Abstract: As suggested by M. Foucault, neoliberal governamental form of power is 
a very effective pedagogical tool able to produce a specific form of subjectivity.  
This paper is aimed at empirically investigating this kind of identity from the 
particular viewpoint of drug consumption. Through an analysis of the empirical 
material gathered through the qualitative techniques of the in-depth interview, the 
group interview and participant observation, the article will explore the individual 
subjectivities of a number of young drug users. The focus of the analysis will be 
prevalently on the way in which the interviewees handle their own and their peers’ 
consumption, as well as the criteria they adopt to decide where the line lies 
between recreational drug-taking and drug abuse. The issue of drug use was not 
chosen at random. As it stands on the crossroads between freedom and addiction, 
pleasure and pain, autonomous action and neurochemical conditioning, it 
constitutes (as we shall argue below) probably one of the most controversial 
elements of the governmental culture, one that can shed light on many of the 
characteristics of subjectivity that it produces. 
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Economics are the method; the 
object is to change the heart and soul 
M. Thatcher 
 
 
Introduction  
 
Some accuse Michel Foucault of having been an overly restless thinker1, 
i.e. of having broached a number of areas of analysis but never following 
through with them, as he was always moved by an impelling need to 
constantly turn his thoughts to new directions. This characteristic of his, 
while on the one hand leading to a certain amount of dissatisfaction in 
those who seek an organic, comprehensive vision of social realities in the 
Frenchman’s work, at the same time constitutes an extraordinary resource 
for those who interpret Foucault’s written output as a kind of toolbox (a 
metaphor that has by now become worn, but was held dear by Foucault 
himself) to be used as an aid to research2. 
Perhaps one of the areas where this particular characteristic of 
Foucault’s can be most clearly seen is the concept of liberal 
governmentality. Introduced between 1977 and 1978 during the course he 
taught at the Collège de France entitled ‘Security, Territory, Population’ 
(Foucault, 2005) and taken up again the following year during the course 
on ‘The Birth of Biopolitics’ (Foucault, 2006), the idea of governmentality 
has gradually become a “field of study”3 in itself, at the centre of which we 
find the profound transformations that have revolutionized the exercise of 
power from the 18th century to the present day and the effects these changes 
have had on forms of subjectivization. 
                                               
1 See, for example, S. Catucci (2000) specifically in reference to the issues discussed in the 
present article, Read (2009). 
2 Moreover, it should be at least briefly mentioned that even the toolbox metaphor needs to 
be precisely defined. As A. Fontana (2008) noted in an article published in a recent 
collective work dedicated to the importance of Foucault in the contemporary world, it would 
be naïve to think that one can find an orderly series of analytical tools in his work ready to 
be used for a systematic interpretation of reality. Rather, Foucauldian thought attempts to 
stimulate awareness, suggest a certain angle from which to examine an issue, or orient 
scholars in constructing their subjects for investigation. To further explore these and other 
aspects of Foucauldian methods, see P. Veyne (1998, pp. 7-65). 
3 On this matter, see the collective publication edited by Burchell, Gordon and Miller (1991) 
with the emblematic title The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality.  
A momentary Lapse of Reason                                                                                       L. Mori 
 
 
ITALIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION, 6 (3), 2014  
 
72 
To summarize briefly, for Foucault the governmental form of power can 
be distinguished from sovereign power thanks to four defining features. 
Firstly, the wielding of governmental power is in no way a self-referencing 
exercise. This form identifies a second and more fundamental reality, called 
society; this becomes the privileged object of this form of power, which has 
the task of managing and improving society by identifying and exploiting 
its internal dynamics. Secondly, this form of power is not exercised by a 
clearly defined central institution. Government of society is managed 
through a series of strategies and techniques that do not belong to one 
specific institution or another – whether prison, family, hospital or the State 
– but are spread around within the whole body of society (Foucault, 2005, 
pp. 92-95). Thirdly, governmentality is a form of approach to power that is 
basically frugal, sober and not showy in the least. It mostly conditions its 
subjects in indirect ways and favours adjustments to the contexts for action 
rather than to the actions themselves. Fourthly – and lastly – 
governmentality is distinguished by the fact that it makes the market and 
economic policy its particular form of self-validation. If it is true that 
society has its own dynamics, which the powers that be are called on to 
understand and promote, then we need to identify the place where these 
dynamics emerge most clearly. Governmentality pinpoints this place as the 
market and believes that the most fitting discourse to explain these 
dynamics is economic science (Foucault, 2006, p. 37).  
Although Foucault again and again states that the spread of the devices 
of government has profound effects in terms of subjectivization, the 
empirical studies inspired by it have but rarely investigated the concrete 
consequences obtained regarding the sphere of individual identities. At the 
core of their analyses most scholars have placed the synergies and conflicts 
that the common points and differences between the various technologies 
of government have given rise to (Rose, 1999, p. 21). Only sporadically 
have these technologies been taken into consideration in terms of their 
educational value and the effects they have had on the people subjected to 
their actions. This is why, in this paper, we will attempt to take a step in 
that direction. In other words, we will try to examine governmental devices 
first and foremost as pedagogical devices designed for two main purposes: 
creating a precise environment for individual action and socializing 
individuals towards a specific form of self-representation and self-
government (O’Malley, 2008a, p. 454).  
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The viewpoint chosen from which to study the phenomenon is the issue 
of psychoactive-substance use. Through an analysis of the empirical 
material gathered through the qualitative techniques of the in-depth 
interview, the group interview and participant observation, in the following 
pages we will explore the individual subjectivities of a number of young 
drug users. The focus of the analysis will be prevalently on the way in 
which the interviewees handle their own and their peers’ consumption, as 
well as the criteria they adopt to decide where the line lies between 
recreational drug-taking and drug abuse. The study, begun in April 2014 
and still ongoing, has so far managed to bring to completion twelve in-
depth interviews each lasting approximately one-and-a-quarter hours (nine 
of which with young adults living in Bologna and its province and three 
with residents of the city and province of Verona), two group interviews 
(the first carried out with three residents of Verona and the second with a 
further five young adults living in Verona and province) and three 
observational sessions4. Naturally, the issue of drug use was not chosen at 
random. As it stands on the crossroads between freedom and addiction, 
pleasure and pain, autonomous action and neurochemical conditioning, it 
constitutes (as we shall argue below) probably one of the most 
controversial elements of the governmental culture, one that can shed light 
on many of the characteristics of subjectivity that it produces. 
The paper is structured as follows: first of all we will discuss the issue 
of liberal governmentality above all in relation to the birth of what we call 
the homo oeconomicus. The hypothesis behind our analysis is that, when 
we talk about homo oeconomicus, more than dealing with one subject we 
find ourselves faced with a source of subjectivization or, in other words, a 
subjectivizing matrix or grille: a subjectivity-producing mechanism able to 
function across the most disparate of human practices, mind-altering 
substance use included. We will then continue by directly introducing the 
issue of drug consumption and the meanings this has developed in modern 
societies. The basic idea is that modernity has categorized drug 
consumption in mainly hedonistic terms, marginalizing all the other forms 
                                               
4 In order to corroborate the interview material, we decided to observe modes of drug use ‘in 
the flesh’. The writer went out three times to nightclubs in both Bologna and Verona, each 
time accompanying the interviewees and their friends. It was not always easy to observe the 
phenomenon and certain facets of the researcher’s identity – first and foremost age, as 
significantly older than the average age of the people who generally frequent these 
nightspots – somewhat hindered (but did not completely impede) the use of this technique. 
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of meaning that were once linked to this experience. This is an essential 
point. By becoming a luxury good the consumption of which involves some 
risk (Schivelbusch, 1992), drugs have also become potentially interesting 
goods for the homo oeconomicus, who can fully exercise his maximizing 
logic on them. In the final part, ample room will be given to an analysis of 
the empirical material. To give a hint of some of the results, we could say 
that our reading of the interviews highlighted a subjectivity structure in line 
with the theoretical coordinates plotted by the governmental frame. The 
individuals concerned approach mind-altering substances from within a 
strict cost-benefit mindset. The reasons why they consume these substances 
essentially lie in the improvement in how they present their individual 
selves within various interactive settings. Nonetheless, as we will argue 
below, this practice can lead to a series of side effects of varying severity. 
Those who do not “stay on top of it”, who fail the difficult test of keeping 
their drug use under control, are exposed to the sanctions of the group. It is 
this dual nature – at the same time hedonistic and risky – that makes drugs 
one of the most emblematic areas of self-government. 
 
 
Markets and subjects: the neo-liberal form of governmentality 
 
Talking about liberal governmentality, as we are doing, may seem 
redundant. This is because, for Foucault, liberalism and governmentality 
coincide – tracing the genealogy of the governmental approach means also 
tracing the genealogy of liberalism. Nevertheless, when we refer to 
liberalism from the Foucauldian point of view, we should not conceive it in 
terms of a moral theory or an ideology but rather as political reasoning 
(Stangherlin, 2007, p. 133), in other words as a strategy that can be used to 
provide a solution to the issue of government. We could even say that 
governmentality constitutes a form of control designed to leave the subjects 
it exercises control over free. It has two main distinguishing components: 
the first, which we might call the negative side, is the constant limitation to 
its own sphere of action. Governmentality arose as a backlash against 
excessive government and excessive control, which is why it always tries 
not to intervene too strongly. The second component, on the other hand, is 
seen in a more positive light and is designed to produce the liberties that 
governmentality tries to guarantee. Let us take for example freedom of 
enterprise and commerce, of political beliefs or of expression. In order to 
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ensure all these freedoms, refraining from taking action is not enough. On 
the contrary, the conditions need to be created whereby these freedoms can 
flourish: avoiding the formation of monopolies, educating the masses, 
allowing the free circulation of information, and so on. This is why the 
governmental approach is built on a mindset based on a paradox: “as it is a 
consumer of freedom, liberalism must produce freedom and, at the same 
time, handle it through means of control: this approach constantly wavers 
between the production, limitation and destruction of freedom” (Sorrentino, 
2008, p. 111).   
The interpretative strategy we will adopt below, rather than highlighting 
the paradoxes and conflicts generated by the push-and-pull between the 
negative and positive sides of liberalism, will attempt to demonstrate that 
the clash between the two components is actually harmonized within the 
particular inflection given to the liberalist point of view that goes by the 
name of neo-liberalism. This inflection, which can be traced back to the 
second half of the nineteen-seventies, in Foucault’s analysis is preceded by 
two other ways of practicing the art of government: we are talking about 
classical liberalism and welfare liberalism (Rose, O’Malley & Valverde 
2006, p. 92; Seddon, 2010, pp. 11-12).  
One could argue that classical liberalism is dominated by the 
aforementioned negative component. The main object of criticism in this 
regime is the excessive control exercised by the political system on society. 
Here, we are at the dawn of the industrial revolution and the root metaphor 
behind this vision is the free market. Conceived essentially as a place for 
exchanges between autonomous, rational subjects, it constitutes the point 
beyond which political power cannot go. From a symbolic point of view, 
Le Gendre’s laissez nous faire is the attitude that best captures the spirit of 
this particular season. In this formula, not only does the wholly negative 
side of freedom come to the fore, but we can also infer the set-up 
characterizing relations between government and market: the market is 
something separate from the government, it exists independently of it and 
works according to laws of its own that the government must be careful not 
to obstruct. 
The welfare liberalism structure, however, is rather different. It 
originates with condemnation of the effects produced by market dynamics. 
Unregulated industrialization leads to devastating repercussions such as 
extreme poverty, inequality and delinquency. If left to itself, society is 
destined to face serious forms of degeneration, therefore governments have 
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to take direct action, measures that can ensure some minimum standards of 
security for citizens. For this reason, the welfare state season is dominated 
by the positive component and its key symbol is the Marshall conception of 
citizenship, i.e. the idea that social rights such as the right to healthcare, 
education and welfare represent the profoundest expression of political 
affiliation (Zolo, 1994). However, despite the differences that separate 
classical and welfare liberalism, they still share the same ontological 
conception of market and government. Indeed, even in a welfare state the 
market is something distinct and separate from the government and again 
operates outside of governmental activities.  
Against this background, things change radically when we examine the 
third and last season: neo-liberalism. This phase emerges as a firmly critical 
stand taken against the consequences of welfare policies. The argument 
goes that the presence of the state will only lead to rigidity and fiscal crises, 
that welfare generates a “nanny culture” which makes individuals passive 
and incapable of looking after themselves and their families. The measure 
chosen to get around this problem aims to get individuals themselves to 
autonomously guarantee the same levels of security that were previously 
provided at government level. The strategy consists of extending the 
market logic to a number of environments, for example healthcare and 
education, which were previously considered outside its domain. 
Privatization and competition thus become the coordinates upon which the 
whole set of neo-liberal symbols is plotted (Brown, 2006, p. 694). First of 
all, a regime of competition, unlike a welfare regime, is something that 
spurs individuals to action, puts their capabilities to the test and forces them 
to be creative. Secondly, it is thanks to the regime of competition that 
efficiency and productivity are improved, prices can be lowered and 
bureaucracy can be seriously cut down to size. The point, however, is that, 
unlike the practice of commerce (which classical liberalists hold as 
something natural and spontaneously produced by human activity), 
competition is here presented as an artificial situation requiring continual 
intervention to maintain it (Foucault, 2006, pp. 110-112). The fact is that 
markets, if left wholly to themselves, tend to allow the formation of 
monopolistic regimes that cannot but alter (if not wipe out completely) 
normal competition dynamics. Therefore government action is incessantly 
asked for in order to ‘keep markets alive’ by creating the most perfect 
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conditions for competition possible5. These reflections suggest that, with 
neo-liberalism, the line that during the previous liberal seasons clearly 
separated government policy from market dynamics is becoming fainter 
and fainter. Now we have a situation where on the one hand the market 
exists only thanks to governments’ actions, and on the other the market is 
the only arena where governments stake their actions. As Foucault puts it, 
once the neo-liberal perspective has been adopted “we will have to govern 
for the market instead of governing because of the market” (Foucault, 
2006, p. 112). The inconsistency that seems to make neo-liberal 
governmentality unique, therefore, is only so in appearance and is resolved 
as soon as one considers the fact that production and consumption of 
freedoms are practices aimed at constructing the market’s reality, a reality 
which in turn becomes “the general index in which the rule destined to 
define all government action will have to be placed” (Foucault, 2006, 
p.112). 
The reason why it is deemed possible to govern through what Foucault 
(Foucault, 2006, p. 195) defines as a systematic practice of inverting 
“social relationships with economic ones” can be fully understood as soon 
as we consider the idea of neo-liberal subjectivity. What kind of subject is 
produced by this approach? What symbolic coordinates has he been 
provided with in order to sketch his representations? Based on what 
mindsets does he construct his plans for action? Given that the neo-liberal 
world is a world of markets, the subject that belongs to it needs to feel 
comfortable in a competitive environment. For this reason, the neo-liberal 
individual is without doubt a homo oeconomicus, but differently from the 
way the classical liberal individual had of being the same thing. According 
to Foucault (2006, pp. 186-187), classical liberalism founded its particular 
subject on the concepts of need and usefulness. The traditional homo 
oeconomicus was essentially the son of commerce, in other words one who 
sought fulfillment of his needs through processes of exchange. The neo-
liberal subject, on the other hand, is a homo oeconomicus from a more 
entrepreneurial point of view. The whole educational set-up of neo-liberal 
devices encourages individuals to think of themselves as instruments that 
                                               
5 As Foucault himself notes (2006, p. 112), a movement towards perfect competition is an 
absolutely asymptotic one, and it is precisely this characteristic that configures neo-liberal 
governmentality as a form of continuous action on society: “pure competition must and can 
only be an objective, an objective thus presupposing an indefinitely active policy”. 
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can be used, improved and invested in. The neo-liberal subject, therefore, is 
a homo oeconomicus in that he becomes the boss of his own company6. 
It is evident that in neo-liberal discourse the centre of gravity lies in the 
area of production. The neo-liberal subject is doubtless one who keeps 
busy, who makes things, who operates incessantly. This aspect is so 
overwhelming that, according to neo-liberal economists, even when 
subjects are consuming they are really involved in a process of production, 
as they produce their own satisfaction and invest a part of their capital in 
producing this satisfaction. The central node of this anthropological 
perspective is that it can be applied to all areas of human activity. The 
subject acts constantly as an entrepreneur, with the result that all spheres of 
his activities can be analyzed in economic terms. Proof of this is the fact 
that neo-liberal economics are fast becoming an interpretive framework 
that can potentially be applied to the totality of human behaviour. All we 
have to do is skim over the contents page of G. Becker’s (1976) renowned 
work The Economic Approach to Human Behavior to realize what endless 
variety there is in the issues that can and must form part of the spectrum of 
economic analysis: racial discrimination, marriage, law and politics, 
household management, crime and misbehaviour; all the way to drug 
addiction (Becker & Murphy, 1988).  
At the end of the day, economics becomes an interpretive framework 
that is applicable to any deliberate action, or in other words to any action 
that responds systematically to modifications in environmental variables 
(Foucault, 2006, p. 219). What counts in this reading is its ability to shed 
light on the reasoning, the calculation that has led the subject to invest his 
scant resources in one area rather than another. In this fashion, economic 
analysis “is no longer, therefore, an analysis of processes but has become 
an analysis of internal reasoning, of the strategic programming of 
individuals’ actions” (Foucault, 2006, p. 184).  
From points-based driving licences to children’s vaccinations, from 
health insurance to the prevention of cancer, scholars such as P. O’Malley 
(2008b) and N. Rose (1996) have demonstrated quite clearly that neo-
liberal democracies, by systematically privatizing risks that were 
previously dealt with in the public sphere (Rockhill, 2001, p. 365), aim to 
                                               
6 Think, for example, of the pedagogical role which lack of job security occupies in many 
forms of neo-liberal rhetoric: it “encourages workers to see themselves not as “workers” in a 
political sense, […] but as “companies of one” (Read, 2009, p. 30).  
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teach citizens to maintain a calculating attitude towards their own destinies, 
which, in turn, are represented as a series of foreseeable risks that need to 
be acted upon in the present. What seems most interesting in this form of 
pedagogical sensibility, however, is not so much the constant spur to 
‘presentify’ the future as the way in which it configures the subject’s 
interior life. The subject is always driven to observe himself, to monitor 
and measure himself, to reflect on his past actions and on those he will 
perform in future. What appears to be in play here, far from being the old 
mind-body duality, is rather a kind of serious complexification of the 
cognitive components designed for managing actions. The subject is no 
longer represented as the thing that orders its body to act, but as a complex 
of elements standing in relation to each other – some appointed to action, 
others appointed to working out mid-/long-term strategies and yet others 
appointed to assess the validity of those strategies. 
We can find a particularly successful operationalization of this vision of 
subjectivity in the concept of self-efficacy. This concept is the brainchild of 
the Canadian psychologist A. Bandura7, invented – unsurprisingly – in the 
second half of the 1970s. The theory of self-efficacy is based on a deeply 
neo-liberal vision of subjectivity; it refers essentially to how effectively 
individuals believe they will be able to control their own behaviour. The 
concept of self-efficacy should not be confused with the concept of 
perseverance, which on the contrary refers to how precisely individuals 
construct predictions concerning their future perseverance (Ogden, 1995, p. 
411). In a certain sense, self-efficacy regards people’s ability to understand 
how far they can trust themselves. How much will I be able to refrain from 
smoking in the coming months? For how long will I keep up my resolution 
to go to the gym three times a week? These questions belong to the sphere 
of self-efficacy and, as can be seen, presuppose a certain amount of 
complexification of the cognitive area that governs individuals’ actions8. 
They are continually spurred to examine and assess themselves, set 
themselves goals, try to understand what their weak points are and how to 
                                               
7 See Bandura (1977). 
8 The studies carried out in what J. Elster (2001; 2006; 2009) has defined as weak-
willedness or akrasia – in other words the phenomenon of failing to fulfill the commitments 
individuals make to themselves – are indicative of this way of perceiving the subject. 
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improve them, and draw up tables to help them measure their rate of 
improvement9.  
Therefore, given these coordinates for the form of subjectivization 
imposed by the neo-liberal culture, we propose to examine how it has 
worked and is still working in the sphere of psychoactive-substance 
consumption. What are the calculations behind the decision to take drugs? 
What returns are expected on this ‘investment’? What strategies are 
followed to overcome the risks inherent in taking these substances? How 
do subjects manage to monitor their selves within this sphere of action? As 
stated above, we will attempt to provide answers to these questions based 
on empirical evidence, by examining the interview material gathered during 
our research dedicated to young drug users. However, before moving on to 
a reading and analysis of the material, we should first take a look at the 
meaning and significance that drugs are developing in modern societies.  
 
 
Useful pleasures: drugs and modern society 
 
One of the most trite clichés surrounding drugs sees the use of mind-
altering substances as a phenomenon that has accompanied humanity 
throughout its history, one that can be found in every society, every culture 
and every historical period10. As with every cliché, there is doubtless a 
foundation of truth also in this one: it is in fact true that the use of mind-
altering substances is fairly much universal, that it is and has been practiced 
almost everywhere and in every historical age. Nevertheless, when 
referring to this evidence, authors often fail to add that, over the course of 
the centuries, the modes of taking drugs have changed radically and, at the 
same time, also the objectives and meanings behind these forms of 
behaviour. 
If we follow P. Nencini (2002), steamrolling over the complexities of 
the issue as we do so, it is possible to trace a distinction between the mind-
                                               
9 In this relationship with their own selves, neo-liberal subjects are not left alone. In fact, a 
whole complex network of knowledge has flourished which supports the subject in his 
constant search for himself. M. Nicoli (2012, p. 93 onwards), for example, sees one of the 
most fitting examples of this subjectivization device in the multifarious sphere of action that 
is Human Resource Management.  
10 See for example, Leonzio (1969, p. 12); Inglis (1975, p. 4); Weil (1972, p. 5); Lenson 
(1995, p. 7) 
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altering substance consumption of ancient societies and that found in 
modern-day societies. In the former – again according to P. Nencini (2002) 
– the consumption of these substances was inserted into a rigid calendar of 
collective rituals. In other words, drugs were allowed to be used only 
during special celebrations and exclusively for serious supernatural 
purposes. Furthermore, in many cultures drugs were not even taken by 
everyone taking part in the ritual, but only by those qualified to do so, such 
as shamans or other similar figures occupying priest-like roles. The same 
thing could be said about the other traditional purpose of these substances: 
the search for healing. As in the previous case, here it was most often not 
the sick person to take the drug but their healer who, trained to handle the 
substance, had the task of altering his consciousness in order to fully 
exercise his healing powers11. 
In modern-day societies everything has changed and the meaning that 
mind-altering substances have developed for those who take them is 
radically different. Although we cannot say that spiritual and therapeutic 
ends have been completely done away with (Blackman, 2004, p. 123), it is 
beyond doubt that the dominant reasons for taking drugs are different. 
Despite forms of liberal governmentality having long categorized the 
consumption of drugs in terms of addiction (Valverde & O’Malley, 2004, 
pp. 26-28), we only need to put ourselves in consumers’ shoes for a few 
moments to discover that behind their choice to consume certain substances 
lie basically hedonistic aims. To use A. Cohen’s words, “people today take 
drugs for two main reasons: to feel good and to have fun” (Cohen, 1971, p. 
145). 
The hedonistic turn that contemporary societies have given to drugs has 
led to the almost simultaneous emergence of the phenomenon of addiction. 
Almost unheard-of in the societies of the past12, the concept of ‘addiction’ 
seems to stand as the archetype of the social difficulties of our times. For 
some (Nencini, 2002), the most immediate explanation concerns the 
systematic removal of all the protective elements that the shift from 
religious and healing purposes to pure enjoyment has inevitably produced. 
If the principal aim of drug use is purely hedonistic, it therefore becomes 
                                               
11 On this matter, see (as examples, certainly not an exhaustive list): La Luna (1985); 
Csordas & Lewton (1998); Kirmayer (2004). 
12 On this point, it is worth remembering what the historian R. Porter asserted in the mid-
nineties: “If you’d talked about “drug problems” two hundred years ago no one would have 
known what you meant” (Porter, 1996, p. 3). 
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possible to make the practice an almost daily habit. It goes without saying 
that an increase in the frequency with which an individual takes drugs is 
one of the main – if not the main – factor in determining the onset of real 
addiction. Beyond the intrinsic ambiguities of said condition13, the means 
of representing psychoactive substances that are developing are rather 
clear. Drugs are a rather risky pleasure, one that, over time, can undermine 
the very essence of liberal subjectivity. In other terms, they are a pleasure 
that ends up turning the individuals who over-indulge in them into subjects 
deprived of their will, people who are unable to work, make decisions or 
invest in themselves.  
As T. Seddon (2010, pp. 36-99) has noted, each of the three seasons of 
liberal governmentality described above has expressed its vision of 
pleasure in relation to drug use. If we go a little further, we could argue that 
it is precisely by observing the way the pleasures and risks associated with 
drugs are categorized that we can perceive the changes between each of the 
forms of liberalism. In the classical and welfare views of liberalism, drug 
use is constantly connected with degenerate lifestyles, almost always 
involved the working classes. Excessive alcohol and/or opiate consumption 
distracts the proletariat from their roles as workers, weakens their money-
saving capacities and negatively affects their reliability. This is why drug 
use constitutes a question of government and, for the same reason, the 
pleasure deriving from it is a matter to be carefully censored. However, the 
music changes with the arrival of neo-liberalism on the scene. Now we no 
longer have before us a simple worker, but a one-man company trained in 
making forecasts, changes, investments and assessments of his own 
performance. He is well able to evaluate risks and constantly calculate in 
terms of costs and benefits. He cannot fail to have a pragmatic, rational 
attitude towards illegal substances: What good are they? How should they 
be used? What benefits will they bring me? What risks do they involve? 
Approaching drugs can be read as a kind of rational action that springs 
from the desires and beliefs of the individual and seems an excellent choice 
                                               
13 We need to point out that, while publicly made speeches all give the concept of addiction 
and all the conditions deriving from it (cravings, cold turkey, relapse, etc.) unchallengeable 
scientific authority, at the same time the ambiguity and the weaknesses these categories are 
founded on have for some time been known. For an exhaustive round-up of the fallacies that 
characterize the idea of addiction, we recommend B. Foddy & J. Savalescu (2010); for a 
detailed reconstruction of the telling historical and historic-political moments that have led 
to the creation of the science of addiction, please see N. D. Campbell (2010).   
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in the light of these desires and beliefs (Elster, 1993, pp. 33-55; 2001, pp. 
154-161).The crux of the matter obviously lies in attempting to see what 
these beliefs consist of, and above all what these desires are made of. 
To ascertain this point, the empirical material will doubtless come to our 
aid. Nonetheless, before moving on to our analysis of the material, we need 
to clarify some issues concerning the way that neo-liberal subjectivity 
presents the issue of relationships with drugs. First of all, when we 
underline the rational calculations behind decisions regarding drugs, we do 
not mean to refer to theories from the world of economics that aim to 
interpret situations of addiction in terms of a rational form of behaviour14. 
Despite the rather controversial effect these approaches have had15, they all 
– as can be clearly seen – focus on the issue of addiction. 
By this we mean that they make an attempt to explain the state of 
addiction in terms of a choice, and even as a rational one. This vision offers 
an overly schematic and unilateral reading of the paths that lead to 
addiction. In reality, we know full well that there are countless variables 
that can play a role in creating a state of true addiction. Moreover, they 
involve a rather non-strategic vision of rationality. In real life, no consumer 
                                               
14 In its incessant drive to analyze everything regarding human behaviour, neo-liberal 
economic theory has tried to interpret the pathological state of addiction as the outcome of a 
consumption plan drawn up spontaneously by the subject based on adequate information 
regarding the effects that the substance will have both concerning their health and their 
future level of use. In this framework, addiction, far from being a normal condition, is 
rightly defined as a uniquely structured form of intertemporal consumption. The goods that, 
when consumed in the present, determine an increase in consumption in the future are 
defined as addiction-producing. For example, the subject knows perfectly well that by 
satisfying his need to smoke an extra cigarette today will increase the number of cigarettes 
he craves in future and that, at the same time, this behaviour will reduce his life expectancy. 
Nevertheless, the decision to smoke that cigarette is justified as the satisfaction from giving 
in to the craving far outweighs the negative consequences of the action, even when we 
consider the increased future costs that an increased daily ration of cigarettes will involve 
(Chaloupka & Warner, 2000, p. 1542). We recommend reading Becker & Mulligan (1988); 
Becker & Murphy (1997) on this topic. For a reworking of the mainstream version of this 
theory, see Orphanides & Zervos (1992). Discussions of the ‘rational addiction approach’ 
made from a sociological point of view and with varying levels of criticism and appreciation 
of it can be found in Elster & Skog (1999). 
15 According to some (Rogeberg 2004; Malberg 2008), these theories, far from 
demonstrating the ability of neo-liberal economic thought to explain the world, really testify 
to the authority that contemporary societies grant to it and its style of analysis. In particular, 
Rogeberg (2004, p. 272 onwards) proposes an amusing inventory of the various logical 
short-circuits that the different versions of the rational addiction approach lead to.  
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embarks on a relationship with drugs with the goal of becoming addicted, 
nor do they believe that in future their consumption levels will continue to 
rise. What really happens is that the consumer starts with the idea that he 
will be able to calibrate his use each time in order to get the greatest 
amount of pleasure from the drugs while keeping the risks as low as 
possible. It is wholly symptomatic that it was precisely at the beginning of 
the nineteen-eighties that the figure of the so-called recreational user made 
its appearance in the specialist literature on drugs16. This figure represents 
drug use that takes place above all at the weekend (or at other moments of 
an individual’s free time) and is practiced for pure enjoyment purposes; a 
vital element of this type of consumption is that it does not lead to negative 
consequences in the management of the role set the individual is inserted 
in. The recreational consumer is one who, despite making use of mind-
altering substances, manages to keep up with his work, social and relational 
commitments without altering his performances from either a quantitative 
or qualitative point of view. 
This rough sketch of the figure of the recreational user allows us to shed 
light on a second aspect that again holds great importance concerning neo-
liberal subjectivity. We mentioned above that neo-liberal subjectivity is 
characterized above all in terms of production and business; therefore we 
need to be particularly careful when dealing with the subject of pleasure. 
Indeed, as we know, a businessman identity is not exactly a hedonistic 
identity; on the contrary, it is built on the foundation of an ability to 
postpone gratification in view of greater and more general goals. If that is 
how things stand, then why should a neo-liberal self turn to drugs? What 
kind of pleasure is he seeking? How can we harmonize the business 
philosophy with his search for pleasure? 
D. Lenson (1995, pp. 69-74) has investigated the relationship between 
drugs and pleasure demonstrating clearly the gap between the pleasure 
brought about by drugs and that brought about by other forms of 
consumption. A point he stresses in particular is linked to what we could 
define as the transitivity of the pleasure arising from these substances. An 
ice cream is enjoyable in itself. Its taste is what leads to the pleasure and 
the pleasure will run out just as soon as the last spoonful has been eaten. 
With drugs it is a whole different story. The pleasure is not tied so much to 
                                               
16 For a summary of the literature on recreational consumption, please see Nicholson, 
Duncan and White (2002). 
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the act of consumption but to the way their effects transform the subject’s 
way of being alive. Therefore the pleasure lies in the new way of 
experiencing reality made possible by the drugs. For example, dancing is 
enjoyable even without drugs, but after taking Ecstasy it is much more so. 
Drugs’ ability to induce pleasure “lies in their power to transfer the 
pleasure-giving or pleasure-enhancing capability to other objects, or to 
enhance whatever capacity for giving pleasure was already present in those 
objects (Lenson, 1995, p. 71). 
C. Duff (2007a; 2007b) has tried to adopt these theoretical reflections 
and insert them into an empirical research project. The main interest in this 
attempt lies in the idea of empirically studying drug consumption from the 
point of view of the transitivity of the pleasure they give. According to 
Duff (2007b, pp. 506-507), N. E. Zinberg’s famous discovery concerning 
the vital role of sets and settings on the effects produced by drugs has 
always been interpreted in strictly physical terms17. The suspicion, 
however, is that the pleasure derives more than anything from the 
performance potential implicit in the different substances (Duff, 2007a, p. 
386), i.e. the hypothesis is that drugs activate a different way of presenting 
oneself, of perceiving and experiencing spaces and of relating to others. In 
the stories recounted to Duff, no one ever eulogizes about the pleasure of 
the drug in itself but about the pleasure obtained when doing things under 
its effects. Nonetheless, in Duff a markedly communalist interpretation 
seems to prevail. By this we mean that in his descriptions it seems that 
pleasure should be considered in connection with a series of practices and 
settings all linked by the value of communal experiences and strengthening 
the affective relationships between friends. When Duff talks about 
performance enhancement it seems that, in one way or another, he is 
referring to the enhancement drugs provide regarding the subject’s capacity 
to perceive and communicate his sense of belonging to his group of friends. 
It is no accident that among the authors and texts most frequently quoted by 
Duff we find Times of the Tribes (Maffesoli, 1996).  
The cues given by the empirical material to be discussed shortly lead us 
towards a vision that is rather different from Duff’s. That is not to say that 
                                               
17 Thanks to an empirical study carried out on a number of heroin users in New York City, 
the American psychiatrist and psychoanalyst N.E. Zinberg managed to highlight the direct 
influence that the context for taking the drugs (the setting) and the attitudes and expectations 
the consumers demonstrated regarding the substance (the set) have on the psychoactive 
effects of the substances themselves (Zinberg, 1986).   
A momentary Lapse of Reason                                                                                       L. Mori 
 
 
ITALIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION, 6 (3), 2014  
 
86 
there are no so-called communalist elements in the interviews we 
performed, but in these sessions such elements emerged in a new light, as if 
the reference to the importance and vitality of friendships had a ritualistic 
value more than anything. In our material, it is as if issues relating to 
friendship and belonging were a sort of ‘professed policy’ while the basic 
coordinates of the actual ‘working policy’ were quite different. The opinion 
we have been able to form thus far is that, behind the stories recounted to 
us, one can infer that drugs have value as devices that help improve users’ 
capacities to be individuals, and, at the same time, that the peer group and 
the relational context act as a stage where each individual can put his or her 
self on show. It was S. E. Cahill (1998, p. 132) in his penetrating analysis 
of the work of E. Durkheim and E. Goffman who stated that “the person is 
a social fact and a topic for sociological study”. By saying this he meant to 
simultaneously underline the socially constructed nature of individuality 
and the coercive pressure that this can exert on the person. This means, 
then, that being individuals, far from being a natural condition, is on the 
contrary a praxis that needs to be acquired and worked on, one that society 
connects a whole variety of positive and negative sanctions to depending 
on the extent of the success (or failure) achieved in maintaining the 
practice. The hypothesis, therefore, is that drug use is not, as so many 
believe, a means for breaking the rules that govern the production of 
individuality (Maffesoli’s tribes, the orgiastic ethic stressed again and again 
by the analysts of rave parties) but a strategy for adhering to them all the 
better. In less cryptic terms, what emerges from the interviews we carried 
out is a way of taking drugs whose main purpose is to present the self in a 
better light. With this as our foundation, we can realize that even mind-
altering substance use, in line with the theories of neo-liberal 
governmentality on a broader level, can and does become an investment in 
oneself. This is not so much because the subjects who take drugs invest in 
that purchase in order to give themselves pleasure, but because the 
investment in the substances is characterized as a way to construct and 
represent a better self, a more effective self, i.e. one who is more skilled at 
handling the whole symbolic structure necessary for the construction of that 
same self. 
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“As long as you stay on top of it”: drug socialization processes 
 
When observing the modes of drug consumption, going to the locations 
where this takes place and talking to the people who indulge in the practice, 
one has the impression that drugs are elements that are deliberately 
removed18. Everyone is aware of the fact that in these contexts it is much 
more likely to encounter people who have taken some form of drug than 
people who are completely sober. As the interviewees have stressed again 
and again, it is the contexts themselves, the way they are structured and 
their timetables that almost force one to alter one’s consciousness.  
 
Well, given the time of night, how long it goes on, the kind of rave, it’s obvious that 
people in those places take drugs. Like, how else do you … I mean it’s obvious you 
need something to keep you going and help you have fun. Otherwise you totally 
flake (Marco, 24 years old, Bologna). 
 
Despite all the evidence, our period of observation allowed us to 
ascertain that drug use rarely becomes a subject of conversation during the 
course of the evening. The same could be said about the effects and 
sensations associated with taking them. In the three field trips we have 
managed to make so far, drugs have always made their appearance in an 
extremely restrained, unassuming way. On a couple of occasions, for 
example, just before going into the nightspot chosen by the young people, 
one member of the group started passing a bottle of mineral water around 
their friends. Everyone took some small sips, passing the bottle from 
person to person without comment and without asking anything about the 
contents. In reply to the researcher’s query, two of the group said that it 
was a bit of MDMA dissolved in water19. They added that the drug had 
been obtained that afternoon from a friend of the group and would keep 
them going all that night. On the third occasion, the substances were 
obtained at the nightspot itself. One member of the group moved away 
                                               
18 On the concept of deliberate removal, we recommend the analysis that P. Bourdieu (1995, 
pp. 181-191) proposes regarding the relationship that the Church entertains with money. 
19 MDMA (3,4-methylenedioxy-N-methylamphetamine), more commonly known as 
Ecstasy, is a methlyamphetamine with notable stimulatory and empathogenic effects, 
although it is not a real psychedelic drug. We should point out that in the jargon used by 
consumers, the label MDMA generally refers to the drug sold in powder form, with few 
adulterants, and usually dissolved in water or some other beverage. The name Ecstasy, on 
the other hand, refers only to MDMA in tablet form. 
A momentary Lapse of Reason                                                                                       L. Mori 
 
 
ITALIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION, 6 (3), 2014  
 
88 
shortly after entering the club, whispering to two friends that he was “going 
shopping”. He came back after around twenty minutes, dissolved some 
MDMA (in a glass of beer this time) and, after taking a couple of draughts, 
left the others to finish the drink. No one asked him anything about the 
details of his purchase (where he managed to buy it, from whom, how 
much it cost, how pure it was, etc.); they simply sipped the beer and 
continued to dance or chat as they had been doing until then. During the 
same night out, we observed three members of the group as they left the 
nightclub four or five times for around fifteen minutes each time. Once 
they returned, these individuals started dancing again with the rest of their 
friends without anyone asking any questions about where they had been or 
what they had got up to outside. When questioned by the researcher, they 
volunteered the information that they had bought a gram of cocaine, which 
they preferred to take outside and in their own time, rather than taking it 
hurriedly in the public bathrooms in the nightclub where they could be seen 
by security. 
The same discretion could also be seen regarding the effects of the 
drugs. Little over half an hour after taking the substances, the signs could 
be quite clearly seen in the faces of the young people and in their 
behaviour. Their pupils were visibly dilated, some of them could not help 
but move their jaw continuously as if they were chewing something tough, 
their movements were freer and easier, they seemed much more ‘into’ the 
music on the dance floor and even their style of communication seemed 
more intense and much enriched as far as non-verbal cues were concerned. 
Despite the decidedly euphoric atmosphere, on none of the three occasions 
was it possible to record any comment regarding the quality of the drugs or 
the feelings and sensations they engendered. Everything went on as if the 
state that appeared so intense and euphoric to the researcher’s eyes had 
been reached entirely naturally – that is to say, as if there were no drugs 
behind it. 
These reflections, developed on the field, were later put to the 
interviewees as starting points for reflection and discussion. One has to 
admit that it was off-putting to realize that the reaction obtained in both the 
group interview and in the course of the individual interviews was the same 
as the reaction P. Bourdieu talks about in relation to his conversations with 
bishops about the Church and money: in other words, laughter. In response 
to the question about why they talked so little about the drugs during their 
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nights out, the young people always burst out laughing. Here are some 
examples: 
 
How come when you take drugs, the last thing you talk about is the drugs 
themselves? 
(laughter) I’d never thought about it … (laughter) I suppose you’re right. 
But it’s normal, you know, you start going on about how this one’s better 
than the last time … more or less intense (laughter), I hate guys who go on 
like that. I mean, if you like it, just shut up, dance and enjoy it. What need is 
there to say ‘I’m out of it, I’m totally out of it’ … the ones who go on like 
that are usually newbies, dickheads… (Flavio, 28 years old, Bologna). 
 
I noticed that being out of it isn’t a topic you talk about very readily when 
you’re out clubbing … 
What do you mean? 
Well, I’ve seen you take MD and get pretty out of it, but the thing that 
strikes me is that no one ever talks to the others about how they feel, about 
the quality of the drug and so on. 
Well … (laughter) what can we say? In the end we know what it’s like or 
not like. It’s always the same business20, there’s no need to say it to each 
other every time. You know, it’s a bit sad to go around saying (laughter) 
“Oh I’m so high”, “Oh I’m totally out of it now”… (Michele, 27 years old, 
Verona).  
 
Therefore we could say that there is an expert, even professional way to 
take drugs that for some reason avoids openly displaying the sensations 
they produce or how high the user feels. From what we have observed and 
heard, it would appear that, contrary to our intuition, effective self-
management actually has a certain value in this context. Indeed, how 
should we interpret the care that the interviewees take not to let others see 
what effects they perceive due to the drugs they take if not in terms of a 
systematic ‘interruption of the paths of perception and penetration’ 
(Goffman, 1988, p. 84) the others could use to reach them? Even here we 
find, at least in this writer’s opinion, one of the most fundamental 
characteristics of neo-liberal subjectivity, i.e. an individual’s capacity for 
self-control and self-monitoring. This facet has already been stressed in 
various different studies on drug use; they all concur in highlighting the 
controlled nature of the pleasure that modern-day users appear to look for 
                                               
20 An approximate translation of the term “tega”, a typical slang expression used in Verona. 
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in their encounters with mind-altering substances. Among the various 
studies available on this topic21, we should at least mention Saldanha’s 
(2001) on the international raver community found in the state of Goa in 
India. Saldanha (2001) writes that, beyond all the rhetoric about open-
mindedness and feelings of cosmic oneness that members of this sub-
culture often pepper their speech with, the greatest prestige among ravers is 
accorded to those who, despite taking Ecstasy, still manage to keep up a 
reliable level of interaction without giving any bodily or behavioural signs 
that their consciousness has been excessively altered. 
In order to guarantee appropriate behaviour, drug users cannot count 
exclusively on their individual capacities for self-control. There is a whole 
series of what we will call instruments used to avoid showing excessive 
signs of an altered consciousness. Eye drops, sweets, chewing gum, 
sunglasses and baseball caps with the peaks deliberately lowered are some 
of the elements that make up the identikit of the recreational drug-taker. 
 
Well, in the morning when you leave the club … you know, your face looks 
pretty bad. I don’t like being seen looking like that. It’s not just in case you 
get stopped by the police … it’s in general. I mean … I don’t like, you 
know, going into a café for breakfast and having people think ‘just look at 
those druggies’. 
So? 
So maybe I use some eye drops, especially if I’ve been smoking – I’ve got 
blue eyes and they just get all red right away if I smoke. But with drops no 
one can see anything. Or maybe I put on sunglasses if the weather’s good 
… things like that (Mario, 23 years old, Verona). 
 
I’ve noticed that baseball caps are all the rage in the world of drum’n’bass. 
Have they got a special meaning? 
They’re all the rage in the world of druggies (laughter) … ‘cause when 
you’ve got two pupils like headlights ‘cause of the MDMA or speed you’ve 
taken, if you go round with a baseball cap with the peak pulled down over 
your face it’s not as obvious. Girls do that a lot, like you’ve seen (Niccolò, 
31 years old, Bologna). 
 
A further element worthy of note concerns the control these young 
people exercise over their bodies and their behaviour, both when dancing 
                                               
21 See for example Mugford (1991); Green and Moore (2009); Hutton (2010); Järvinen and 
Fynbo (2011). 
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and when chatting. It is well known that stimulants, MDMA in particular, 
among their various effects have the ability to heighten sensations in the 
body, especially those associated with music and rhythm, and make the self 
feel naked and exposed. Users often reveal that under the effects of MDMA 
they can perceive the music and dance incredibly intensely; they also state 
that they manage to say things to their friends and partners that they 
probably would never have said without the effects of the drug. All this 
endangers their ability to keep up dignified forms of behavior, which has to 
be ensured through continuous and expert self-observation. 
 
I don’t like playing the clown. I mean, everything’s fine by me, but, you 
know, really … some people just let themselves go totally. What are they, 
children, that as soon as they take half a tab they strip off their shirts and 
dance on the tables, spare tyres in full view and sweating like animals?! 
Man, you can’t look at someone like that. I don’t want to go to those clubs 
anymore if I’m going to see that kind of thing (Giulio, 27 years old, 
Verona).  
  
Once one of my friends was high on MD and he bumped into one of his 
exes … Talk about a bloodbath! He told her that while they were together 
he cheated on her, that he slept with one of her friends. He just blurted out a 
whole load of home truths. She burst out crying and in the end he was the 
one who came over as a total bastard. But you see, it was her who left him 
to go off with some other guy. Then of course there was a whole big thing 
with her friend. Total disaster all round. I was with them that evening and I 
saw he was talking and talking away. I wanted to say something to him, but 
by then anyone could see it was too late. You could see he had totally lost 
the plot. What an idiot (Tommaso, 27 years old, Bologna).  
 
What shines through, then, is a sort of etiquette that, as we have seen, 
comprises postures, modes of behaviour, rules for conversation and dress 
codes. Anyone who fails to respect these habits, or who trips up when 
trying to comply with them, risks losing their status, prestige and reputation 
within their circle of friends.  
Moving on to an examination of the motivations behind drug use, the 
attitude that emerges from the empirical material is of a markedly proactive 
kind. It is a strongly instrumental attitude that sees drugs as a kind of 
flavouring, a selection of different sauces to be added to different 
situations. Here as in the previous paragraph we must point out the ability 
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that such pairings seem to require and the effort of planning there is behind 
them. 
 
S1 Like, if it’s just us, two or three of us I mean, we like music, so if there’s 
a DJ set I want to listen to properly I don’t go taking MD but maybe I go for 
amphetamines instead. Just to have energy, dance properly and enjoy the 
music properly. I don’t even want to be too … not even able to … or I 
suppose I mean when you just start talking to the first person you see and 
you’re out of it all night blathering on about God only knows what! You 
stay in the zone, cap and hood pulled up and go … you just do what you 
want to do and at least you’re with it, you’re all there […] Then, of course, I 
don’t know … you go to Venice to see the Carnival and there, OK, you take 
a quarter, maybe half a wrap. Just to really make the day ours! That’s how 
we are, yeah … but in the end, if we don’t do these things now… Even just 
going around looking at the costumes, if you drink and drink you end up 
being sick and get a headache. But if you do it like that, a bit at a time, you 
have more fun, you keep a grip on the whole day. But you have to plan, of 
course. You already know how … 
 
S2 I saw a film once where they said that drugs are keys that open doors. 
You can’t take a drug without knowing what it does, and what you have to 
do with it, because otherwise it’d be like having a key in your hand but not 
knowing what door it opens. (Verona, int. group no. 2) 
 
S4 You mustn’t ever lose touch with reality. That’s important. Because you 
take the stuff to get away from reality, but not totally. Because it’s you that 
transforms reality, you make your own cinema, do it one way or another … 
but you can’t ever forget it’s you who transforms it. I mean, what I’ve 
learned is that drugs are for being used and you have to know how, when 
and what situations are right for one use or another (Verona int. group no. 
1).  
 
In this writer’s opinion, this last extract constitutes an element that is 
rather indicative of the subjectivity we are attempting to describe. To try to 
leave reality without losing contact with it, that is the game. It should be 
noted how, for a practice of this kind, it becomes necessary to differentiate 
one’s inner life as described above. In order to ‘let yourself go, but not 
totally’, to rationally cloud your rational judgment, you always need to be 
able to count on a split in your self: on one side is the part that lets itself go, 
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while on the other there is the part charged with watching, controlling and 
setting limits.  
From what we have seen thus far, it could seem that the transitivity of 
the pleasure connected with drugs is concretized above all in the 
environments the subject moves in. People take drugs to better enjoy the 
music, to dance better, to have more fun while admiring the carnival 
costumes in Venice. This is certainly true. Nevertheless, behind their drug 
use we can make out a second – perhaps a more crucial – motivational 
component. This component has to do with what we could define as the 
performance side of the self, understood both in terms of verbal 
communication and physical movement. For example, during the 
observation sessions we noted a tendency in the young people: once the 
first effects of the drugs began to make themselves felt, they sought out 
interaction with strangers rather than their own friends. In one case, indeed, 
we were able to note that the group totally broke up for practically the 
whole night and got together again just a few minutes before the club 
closed. This interaction with strangers seemed to have two fundamental 
causes: the first concerns sexual conquest22. Interestingly, among the 
groups studied, even sexual conquest turns out to be a kind of deliberate 
omission in conversation. 
 
S3 Well, sure, if a girl starts coming up to me while I’m dancing, starts 
looking at me and all, well of course I try to get to know her, I check her out 
too, but it’s not like I spend my whole time bouncing all over the dance 
floor like some – I dunno, strutting cocks … checking out girl after girl – 
will she have me, will she not? I mean, that’s what you do when you’re 
drunk. You go to **** [disco near Lake Garda] and you see guys with their 
shirt open and hair all sticking out, totally legless, pestering all the girls, 
touching them, pulling them around … and they just want to dance … 
 
S1 … and then the fight breaks out! (laughter) (Verona, int. group no. 2). 
 
                                               
22 The groups followed on these field trips were composed almost exclusively of young 
men. On one occasion, one young woman was present; she was the girlfriend of one 
member of the group and friend of the others. There is evidently a long and complex 
discussion to embark on regarding gender and the way in which it is enacted and represented 
in the world of recreational drug users and, more in general, within the neo-liberal form of 
governmentality. The data available on this topic are as yet rather scarce, therefore we have 
decided to postpone this kind of analysis until another occasion. 
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Despite what we can read in the interview material, during the 
observation sessions in the nightclubs the search for sexual conquest 
always appeared rather intense. But what is in line with the young men’s 
statements is that there was a certain sobriety in their approaches to 
potential partners. From what we have seen on the field, the first approach 
is always made on the ‘sound’23 and, as the interviewees aver, the contact is 
almost always mediated by the dancing and other forms of non-verbal 
communication. It is precisely in this moment that the investment in drugs 
appears particularly profitable: 
 
If you’ve smoked a thousand joints and drunk a load of beer, obviously you 
can’t hope for anything. I mean, you’re finished, dead, a zombie lurching 
around the club. No one’s going to look at you. And I mean, you don’t even 
fancy it any more yourself. On the other hand, if you’re on a high … a bit of 
MD, a bit of Speed24, you’re a different person. There’s no comparison. 
You’re more into the music, you want to dance, have some fun, and if 
you’re interested in meeting a girl you realize straight away … I mean, you 
see if she’s checking you out or not … 
Do you mean to say you’re more aware? 
Yeah, that’s it! When you’re dancing, if some signals come your way you 
pick them up right away and you know how to pick them up, too. If you’re 
in the mood, of course … But if you’re single, you’re there with your male 
friends, I mean, you know … music’s all very well and good but if you 
meet a girl, all the better, right? (Raimondo, 33 years old, Bologna).  
 
Consistently with what we have already seen, any reference to drugs 
and one’s state of mind due to them is strictly taboo in the encounter with a 
potential partner. Also – perhaps even above all – in this case, everything 
has to happen as if the ease and immediacy of non-verbal communication 
were the fruit of one’s natural self, one’s own personality, one’s normal 
spontaneity and immediacy and not, as is really the case, the result of 
careful management of the psychostimulant effects of the drugs.  
The second reason for interacting with strangers lies in the desire to 
widen social circles. In the economics of the world we are trying to 
describe, it would seem that the prestige of the individual is constructed in 
                                               
23 Term indicating the dance floor in the more underground clubs or at raves. 
24 The street name used for amphetamines. 
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part on the basis of the number of his acquaintances, on the degree of ‘in-
ness’ he can display in certain environments.  
 
In the end, you know, you go to the same places, in Bologna pretty much 
everyone knows everyone else by sight. If you’re even slightly in, you 
know that one guy’s going to go out with one group and another guy with 
another. Then if you go to raves, you like a certain kind of fun, the faces 
you see at **** and **** [well-known underground dance music clubs] are 
always the same. When I go out I like chatting to different people. You 
know, it’s a way to get to know people. I mean … if you go to a party and 
you’re the only one who doesn’t say hello to anyone it’s not … everyone 
else goes off to talk to someone or other and you just stand there? (Lorenzo, 
26 years old, Bologna). 
 
Again in this case, the particular drug taken is important: 
  
If you go to a party stoned, it’s likely you’re going to start chatting, getting 
to know people. The other night I was queuing for the bathroom – I’d just 
smoked a massive joint – I saw a guy I knew by sight, one I’d seen around, 
but I didn’t know what to say … Hi, how are you? Fine, fine, and you? 
Fine, fine … How’re you doing? Fine, fine … I mean, I must’ve seemed a 
total idiot (laughter). When you’re on a high, on the other hand, it’s totally 
different – actually, the danger there is that you go around all evening 
talking to people and you don’t even know who the hell they are 
(Alessandro, 26 years old, Bologna). 
 
At the end of the day, we could almost say that, on the basis of the 
evidence we have seen so far, drugs provide the material energy that allows 
users to make the best possible show of themselves. That is to say, they 
constitute devices to help deal with the rules governing the production of 
individuality. The point we now need to face is: in this game of 
representations, are there any criteria for establishing the line between 
recreational and pathological use? Are there lines that must not be crossed? 
How are these lines made tangible? How are they decided on? Despite the 
fact that this is a rather complex issue and that the evidence currently 
available to us will allow us only to partially explore it, we believe there is 
a criterion which could be defined as external to the contexts for drug-
taking, used to assess the general effect of individuals’ drug consumption 
habits on their lifestyle, as well as a criterion within the context for drug-
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taking, used, on the contrary, to assess subjects’ ability to manage their 
consumption levels. As far as the external level is concerned, it meets the 
requirements of the classic description in the relevant literature of the 
relationship between drug use and role performance. Drug-taking becomes 
problematic when it influences people’s capacity to keep up the 
commitments made in the various environments that make up their social 
life. From this point of view, episodes such as repeated failure to pass 
exams, problems with work, financial difficulties, run-ins with the law, and 
abandonment of hobbies or other activities are all indicators that our 
subjects use to diagnose the problematic nature of their own consumption 
or their friends’: 
 
Well, I had this friend who was taking too much coke. Anyone could see it. 
He was always running around looking everywhere for more coke. He blew 
a whole heap of savings, he went out night after night, then he was wrecked 
when he went to work: maybe he would, like, stay out till five a.m. on a 
Wednesday morning. In the end he was so addicted that the only way for 
him to keep up his habit was to start dealing, and dealing big time. A year 
later they caught him in a taxi with three hundred grams. Prison, then social 
services, he was totally screwed (Luigi, 29 years old, Verona). 
 
I tell myself that this life of going out at night, going clubbing, taking MD is 
OK now because I’m only 23, but I know that in a few years it’ll stop. I 
know that already. I’ll change, the people around me will change, I’ll have 
other interests, other stuff to do. For now I enjoy myself this way and I’m 
careful not to let it get on top of me. 
What do you mean when you say you’re careful not to let it get on top of 
you? How can you tell if you’re not on top of it anymore? 
I think you have to make sure that drugs are just one part of your life – and 
a small one at that – not your whole life. It’s like if I have a big exam in a 
fortnight’s time, I’m hardly going to go out on the tear all night because I 
know that if I do my head’s not with it for two or three days afterwards. 
And besides, I don’t want to give up my hobbies. If, like, someone asks me 
to go climbing early on Sunday morning, on Saturday night I make sure I 
behave myself, I force myself to be good because giving up a climb for the 
sake of a night out is stupid (Francesco, 28 years old, Bologna).   
 
In some cases, it seems that individuals deliberately seek to broaden 
their role set in order to limit the frequency with which they turn to drugs. 
The following testimony is representative of this strategy: 
A momentary Lapse of Reason                                                                                       L. Mori 
 
 
ITALIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION, 6 (3), 2014  
 
97 
I reckon a good way to stay on top of it is to find some interests, some 
hobbies outside of the world of drugs and raves … for example, what I’ve 
done is I’ve started going mountain biking. I kind of started because of a 
friend – he’s not part of the party crew and he loves biking. It was a way to 
see a bit more of him. It’s good because otherwise I’m always surrounded 
by druggies … (laughter). It’s been a way, like, of finding new 
commitments and new interests. I mean, otherwise you just study or work 
and then the only other thing in your head besides study or work is parties, 
getting hold of MD or grass or whatever, and that’s not good (Christian, 24 
years old, Verona). 
 
Moving on to the internal criterion, much has already been said 
regarding it. We could say that anyone who fails to succeed in the difficult 
task of bending the effects of the drugs they have taken to their will in 
order to present themselves in a better light is by definition a problematic 
user. On this note, the empirical material we collected is full of slang terms 
used to indicate individuals whose drug use is out of control: gagge25, 
monsters and zombies are some of the epithets dedicated to those who lose 
control and display excessive signs of their altered state of consciousness. 
More in general, the internal criterion is defined in relational terms. The 
problematic consumer is one who moves and acts awkwardly, who breaks 
all the unwritten rules we have discussed in this paper. This is why these 
individuals are described as not ‘staying on top of it’: 
 
How much to tear it up, how often, like, two or three times a month … it’s 
something you know. Only you know that. Some people can just take, like, 
one tab one evening and end up zombified, unable to move. Another keeps 
swilling down the MD and he’s totally fine. That’s how subjective drugs 
are. As far as I’m concerned, as long as you’re on top of it, you’re fine. 
What do you mean by on top of it? 
I mean you can still hang out with people, interact with them, act normal, 
like! If you see other people are avoiding you, then something’s not right 
(Cesare, 33 years old, Bologna).  
 
In the end, the internal criterion identifies the problematic consumer as one 
who creates a problem for his own individual identity and the identities of 
those he entertains relationships with. At the heart of the matter is the fact 
                                               
25 A typically Bolognese expression meaning ‘large chin’, one that is disproportionate to the 
rest of the face. It is used to refer to stimulant users who fail to control their jaw movements. 
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that what is stigmatized in problematic consumers is not drug-taking in 
itself (understood as a practice that endangers the health), nor is it the 
supposed weakness of character of the person over-indulging. What is 
stigmatized is simply the subject’s technical inability to exploit the effects 
of the drugs in a way that benefits his or her individuality. What is 
stigmatized is a paradoxical and (according to the dictates of neo-liberal 
subjectivity) unacceptable heterogeneity of purpose: taken in order to 
further enhance the sacredness of individuality, in the hands of inept 
consumers drugs turn into instruments for a veritable profanation of the 
self. 
 
 
Conclusions: for neo-liberal subjectivities, neo-liberal policies. 
 
Given all the above, we can now pose the question of which approach in 
terms of social policy is best suited to intercept this kind of subjectivity. As 
has been stressed already in many different places, prohibitionist measures 
never appear to have had great success – to the extent that today it appears 
that there is a deep rethinking of the base coordinates of the so-called war 
on drugs taking place on a global level. In any case, beyond the most 
strictly ideological and controlling standpoint, we would like to stress that 
repressive and prohibitionist attitudes are in open contrast to the way the 
neo-liberal mindset has of representing the world and the subjects that 
inhabit it. The various versions of prohibitionism all share a background 
view that depicts consumers of mind-altering substances as pathological 
cases. In this mental landscape, drugs constitute a threat to the free will of 
the subject, and whoever uses them is destined to see their pleasure quickly 
turn into pain and desperation. Addicts are sick people who need to be 
treated and, by definition, until they have been rehabilitated they will find 
themselves cast out of society26. However, a discourse structured thusly is 
destined to fall flat when it comes to neo-liberal subjectivity. This 
viewpoint depicts a world that does not exist, one in which today’s drug 
                                               
26 On this issue, we call to mind the fact that, according to R.K. Merton, drug addicts and 
alcoholics make absolutely perfect examples of individual retreatists: “people who […] are 
in society but not part of society. […] As they do not share the common framework of 
values, they can be included among the members of society (as distinct from the population) 
only on a fictitious level” (Merton, 1959, p. 247). 
A momentary Lapse of Reason                                                                                       L. Mori 
 
 
ITALIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION, 6 (3), 2014  
 
99 
users have no chance of finding their niche. As we have seen, drugs are not 
conceived and used as means of exclusion, but of inclusion; not as threats 
to rationality but as ways of exercising it. 
An approach that seems to be decidedly more in line with the neo-
liberal vision is undoubtedly that of harm reduction policies. Indeed, one 
could say that harm reduction is perhaps the most radically neo-liberal form 
of drug policy. First and foremost, the term harm reduction breaks 
definitively with the pathologizing concept of drug addicts who are unable 
to think or act for themselves and constructs an image of drug users as 
individuals who are responsible for the damage they may cause to 
themselves and to others. From this we can infer that, contrary to what 
hurried and superficial readings of this policy tend to reveal, a serious harm 
reduction approach certainly does not attempt to minimize the negative 
impact that substance use and abuse can have on the mental and physical 
health of users, nor does it deny the enormity of the effort necessary to 
claw one’s way out of a state of addiction. An effort which, to be 
successful, certainly needs in the majority of cases a professional help such 
as the one provided by many different kinds of psychosocial intervention27. 
Having said this, it is important to stress however that at the heart of the 
concept of harm reduction is a rational concept of the subject. Whatever 
level of addiction the individual is dealing with, he or she is always seen as 
being able to make choices: use sterile syringes rather than recycle those 
already used by others, test Ecstasy before taking it, avoid driving under the 
influence of drugs, and so on and so forth. As a secondary feature, in 
conformity with their concept of the rational individual, harm reduction 
approaches hold that this process of making users responsible for their 
actions should be supported by campaigns to raise awareness about all the 
information available and the organizations that can help them make and 
put into practice their consumption choices. Informative materials, free 
sterile syringes, pill tests outside nightclubs and injection rooms are all 
examples of actions that fully comply with this type of policy28. The third 
                                               
27 In line with this, we should remember that harm reduction does not exclude any kind of 
prevention policy. As we will see later on, harm reduction, generally speaking, frames drug 
policy in a new cultural context. A context in which drug users are no more viewed as sick 
persons with weakened cognitive abilities , but as individuals able to make choices. 
28 Emblematic of this matter are the totally divergent assessments which supporters of the 
harm reduction approach and those of prohibition make regarding the awareness-raising 
campaigns carried out in schools and youth centres about the effects of drugs. For the 
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and final aspect is that the harm reduction approach is particularly in line 
with neo-liberal sensibilities in that it translates the moral categories into 
which prohibitionist approaches have placed drugs into the economic 
categories of risks and benefits29. On this note, we would like to point out 
the inclusive effect behind harm reduction policies. In this particular way of 
representing reality, there is no longer the figure of the hopeless addict, the 
drop-out, the bad guy cloaked in a conspicuous aura of deviance; on the 
contrary, everyone is united by being first and foremost rational players 
who make their choices based on their desires and their beliefs. (O’Malley, 
2008, p. 459).  
Some time ago, reflecting on neo-liberal culture, F. Jameson (1991, p. 
263) wrote the expression, “the market is in human nature … [it] cannot be 
allowed to stand unchallenged; it is the most crucial terrain of ideological 
struggle in our time”. While waiting to begin (and win) this crucial 
struggle, adopting a serious harm reduction policy would appear to be the 
only path we can embark on in order to have any chance of successfully 
dealing with the phenomenon of drug use.  
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